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550 PEOPLE V. B.\KER 
[Crim. No. fiii35. In I3unk. Mar. 2G, H)54.] 
THE PEOPLE, ReSpOllo.ent, v. "\VILBERT BERNARD 
BAKEIl, Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Evidence-Participation in Crime Charged.-Jury's 
conclusion in an uxoricide case that defendant struck fatal 
blows is sustained by evidence that he was in house at time 
of wife's death and that he was in front room with her shortly 
after blows were struck; by £sct that except for his state-
ments implicating another man, made at a time when defense 
claims he was in a clouded state, there is no evidence that 
anyone else except children was in or about house at time 
of offense; and by further fact that while he told police 
officers he had chased an intruder out front door, the children 
testified that front door was locked from inside and that 
they did not hear their dog barking at any time during night 
in question. 
[2] Criminal Law-Province of Court and Jury-Weight of Evi-
dence.-It is for jUf'Y to resolve conflicts in evidence and to 
determine inference.! t.o be drawn therefrom. 
[8] Id.-Evidence-Presnmptions and Inferences-Sanity.-Jury 
could not reasotlably infer from defendant's conduct at an 
uxori('ide trial that he was sane at time of offense where 
he was not brought to trial for more than two years after 
death of hIS wife, where during that period he was confined 
in a mental hospital and was not brought to trial until 
superintendent of hospital certified that he had recoYerl'd 
his sanity so as to be able to assist counsel in conduct of 
his trial, and where there was no showing that defen,l<1nt"s 
mental condition was same at time of his trial as it was 
immediately after death of his wife. 
[4] Id.-Evidence-Presumptions and Inferences-Sanity.-On 
trial of issue raised by plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, 
there is a rebuttable presumption that defendant was sane 
at time crime was committed, and defendant has burden of 
proving his insanity by preponderance of evidence. 
[4] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 70 et seq.; Am.Jur., Ed· 
denc~. § 215. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] HomICide, § 153; [2] Criminal Law, 
§ 658(6); [3, 4] Criminal Law, § 359(8); [5] Criminal Law, 
§ 359(9); [6, 8, 13, 14] Criminal Law, § 793; [7] Stipulntions, 
§28; [9,10,12] Criminal Law, §::!6; [11] Criminal Law, §403; 
[15] Homicide. § 198; [16, 19] H'll1licide, § 2G8; [17] Criminnl 
Law, §§ 25, 37; [18] Homicide, § 196; [20] Criminal Law, § 717j 
[21] Homicide, § 267. 
) 
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[5] Id. - Evidence - Presumptions and Inferences - Insanity.-
Proof that defendant was afflicted with a permanent insanity, 
as distingUished from a temporary or transient insanity, prior 
to commission of crime charged will dispel presumption of 
sanity and raise a presumption that his insanity continued to 
exist until time of commission of crime. 
[6] Id.-Instructions-Presumptions-Insanity.- Where defend-
ant's insanity prior to killing his wife is shown by evidence 
that he had repeatedly been diagnosed as an epileptic with 
clouded state and psychosis, that he had been adjudicated an 
insane person and thrice committed to state mental hospital, 
and that he was on parole from hospital at time of crime, 
and where he was similarly adjudged insane shortly after 
crime was committed, jury should be instructed that proof of 
permanent insanity prior to commission of crime raises a 
presumption that such insanity continuE:d to exist until time 
of offense. 
[7] Stipulations-Effect.-Although defendant cannot complain of 
joinder of his pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason 
of insanity where his counsel stipulated that the two pleas 
could be tried together, he did not by his stipulation waive 
any errors that might have been committed, as a result of 
joinder, by court in instructing jury. 
Criminal Law-Instructions-Presumptions.-Instructions in 
an uxoricide case relating to presumptions of defendant's 
banity were contradictory and ambiguous where jury was first 
instructed that only conclusive presumptions are not rebut-
table. then that on issue raised by plea of not guilty he is 
conclusively presumed to have been sane at time offense was 
committed. and next that all persons are presumed to intend 
the usual and probable consequences of their acts. 
Id.-"Sonnd Mind" and ''Legal Sanity" Distinguished.-
"Sound mind" and "legal sanity" are not synonymous' terms; 
a person is "legally sane" if he knows nature and quality 
of his acts and their wrongfulness, if any, whereas a "sound 
mind" is a healthy and robust mind. neither diseased nor 
injured. 
Id.-"Sound Mind" and "Legal Sanity" Distinguished.-The 
distinction between soundness of mind and legal sanity is 
impliedly recognized in Pen. Code, § 26, whicb provides that 
lunatics, idiots and insane persons are not capable of com-
mitting crimes; and since it is expressly provided in Pen. 
Code. § 21. tbat idiots and lunatics are not of sound mind, 
if soundness of mind and legal sanity were synonymous the 
express provisions of § 26. ext'mpting idiots and lunatics from 
criminal responsibility. would be superfluous because they 
would necessarily be included within provision exempting the 
iDaan .. 
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[l1J Id.-Evidence-Menta.l State.-While evidence of a mental 
infirmity, not amounting to legal insanity, is admissible and 
should be considered by jury on questions of premeditation 
and deliberation, if defendant has a "sound mind" he would 
not have a mental infirmity making him incapable of pre-
meditating or deliberating. 
[12J Id.-Moronity.-Although moronity and mental condition 
caused by epileptic seizures, unless they amount to uncon-
sciousness, are not included within exempting provisions of 
Pen. Code, § 26, nevertheless they may indicate some lack 
of a healthy and robust mind and have bearing on question 
of capacity to premeditate and deliberate. 
[13J Id.-Instrnctions-Presumptions.-It is error to instruct jury 
in an uxoricide case that on trial of issue of not guilty de-
fendant is conclusively presumed to be of "sound mind" 
where evidence shows that he is a moron and has been for 
many years subject to epileptic attacks affecting his mental 
faculties in varying degrees and for varying lengths of time, 
where only evidence pointing to premeditation and delibera-
tion is testimony of his children that he threatened his wife 
earlier in evening in question. but there is evidence that prior 
similar threats were made just before he had an epileptic 
seizure and that, when not suffering such an attack, he had 
a friendly and harmless disposition, and where, following the 
killing, defendant did not attempt to hide the body or to 
mutrilate it to prevent iopntifiMtion 
[14J Id.-Instrnctions-Presumptions.-An instruction in an uxori-
cide case that on trial of issue of not guilty defendant is 
conclusively presumed to be of "sound mind" creates an 
irreconcilable conflict with other instructions that jury could 
consider defendant's mental state in determining whether he 
had the "intent" necessary to constitute malice aforethought, 
premeditation or deliberation. and that a person might be 
"legally sane" and yet be in an abnormal mental or nervous 
condition, and because of such condition might be less likely 
or unable to hold a speciflc intent or a certain state of mind. 
which is an essential ingoredient of a certain crime. 
[15] Bomicide-Instructions-Intoxica.tion.-In an uxoricide case 
it was prejudicial error to give an instruction based on the 
first sentence of Pen. Code, !i 22. declaring that no act com-
mitted by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication 
is less criminal by reason of such intoxication, without also 
givin!! second sentence of code section. that, whenever motive 
or intent is a necel'sary element to constitute any particular 
species or de!!ree of crime, jury may consider the intoxication, 
where there was evidence that defendant had voluntarily taken 
an overdose of both dilantin and phenobarbital on n'ight of 
I. 
t 
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killing, where both of these drugs were described as having 
an intoxicating effect similar to that of alcohol, and where 
there was testimony that when defendant took dosages of these 
dnlgs he acted groggy. like a "drinking man." 
[16] Id.-Appeal-Harmless a.nd Reversible Error-Instructions. 
-Error in failing to give an adequate instruction on intoxi-
eation in an uxoricide case was not overcome by another in-
struction that, even if jury found defendant sane. such a 
ftnding would not preclude then from finding that his mental 
or nervous condition was sucn that he was incapable of de-
liberation or premeditation. where such instruction did not 
inform jury of weisht to be given to defendant's intoxication 
but was responsive to defendant's defense that he was in-
eapable of premeditation because of his moronity, his psycho-" 
logical disorders. and mental deterioration caused by his 
epilepsy. . 
[17] Oriminal Law-Unconsciousness: Intoxication.-Unconscious-
ness is a complete, not pnrtial. defense to a criminal charge 
(Pen. Code, § 26, subd. 5), and although voluntary intoxica-
tion may at times amount to unconsciousness. yet it can only 
have e1fect of negating specific intent. the applicabll' section 
being § 22 and not § 26. subd. 5. 
[18] Homicide-Instructions-Onconsciousness.-Wherl' there wns 
ample evidence in an uxoricide case of voluntary intoxi('ntil;a 
and also evidenoe that defendant was unconscious at time 
of offense because he was in "clouded state" of an epileptic 
attack. it is proper to give an instruction based on Pen. Code, 
126. subd. 5, since defendant's complete defense based on 
unconsciousness was entirely separate from his partial de-
fense based on intoxication. 
[19] Id.-AppeaJ-HarmlesB a.nd Reversible Error-Instructions. 
-Error in failing to give an adequate instruction on intoxi-
cation in an uxoricide case was prejudicial, notwithstanding 
fact that defendant knowingly took his own pills. which had an 
intoxicating effect. to ward off an attack of epilepsy, where 
it was a question for jury whether or not the imminent ap-
proach of such an attack was sufficipnt to render hiB taking 
the pills compulsive and thus in'l"oluntary. and where effect of 
instruction!l given was that ;nry could consider defendant'. 
intoxication only if they found that it was caused in'l"oluntarily 
and that it produced nnl!onseionsness. 
[10] Oriminal Law-Instructions-Requests-Limitations OD Rule. 
.~. -It is incumbent on court in a criminal case to instruct jury 
. " on its own motion, chal"ging them fully and fairly on law 
relating to facts of case .. and it is not relieved of duty to 
live instructions whose necessity is developed through evidence 
) 
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introduced at trial merely beclluse such instructions are not 
requested. 
[21] Homicide-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instruc-
tions.-Where facts revealed by circumstantial evidence in an 
uxoricide case show case to be a very close one on questions 
of guilt, sanity and premeditation, and where numerous errors, 
particularly those relating to instructions, substantially and 
prejudicially affect rights of defendant, a reversal is neces-
sary to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b» from a judgment of the Superior Court of Keru 
County and from an order denying a new trial. William 
L. Bradshaw, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposiug 
death penalty, reversed. 
Henry E. Bianchi for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and James D. Loebl, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant Wilbert Baker was charged by 
information with the murder of his wife, Clara Baker, 011 
April 21, 1951. He entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty 
by reason of insanity. A doubt arose in the mind of the court 
as to the defendant's present sanity, and a trial on that issue 
Was held on June 25, 1951, before a court sitting without a 
jury. Defendant was adjudged insane and was committed 
to the Mendocino State Mental Hospital under section 1370 
of the Penal Code. On March 19, 1953, the superintendent 
of that hospital certified that defendant had recovered his 
sanity, and on March 27, 1953, he was returned to the sheriff 
to be held for trial. (Pen. Code, § 1372.) By.stipulation, 
the issues raised by the pleas of not guilty and not guilty by 
reason of insanity were consolidated for trial. The jury re-
turned verdicts that defendant was guilty of murder in the 
first degree, without recommending life imprisonment. and 
that he was sane at the time the offense was committed. De-
fendant's motion for a new trial was denied. His motion 
for a determination of his present sanity, pursuant to section 
1368 of the Penal Code, was also denied, and he was sentenced 
to death. The appeal to this court is automatic. (Pen. 
Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
) 
) 
l\Iar.1954] PEOPLE tJ. BAKER 
142 C.2d 550; 2G8 P.2d 705) 
555 
Defendant was born and spent most of his life on an 
Arkansas farm. He had no formal schooling and cannot read 
or write. Tests performed at the i\lendocino hospital. after 
the death of his wife, indicated that he is a moron with an 
intelligence quotient of about 70. Defendant's family moved 
to California in 1940. and ultimately settled in Bakersfield. 
where they lived at the time of the alleged offense. Defendant 
and his deceased wife had three children, Larry. Bob. and 
l\Ierlene, who were 8, 10 and 12 years old respectively at the 
time of their mother's death. Defendant and his wife worked 
as agricultural laborers. when they were able to do so. His 
wife suffered from a back ailment for which she had under-
gone two operations, and defendant has a severe form of 
epilepsy that had prevented his working at a regular em-
~; ployment during the four or five years preceding his wife's 
death. His activities were confined to caring for the yard 
about their house, and his in-laws testified that he did a poor 
job of that. Defendant had his first epileptic seizure at the 
age of 15, and they have continued intermittently ever since. 
.. (Defendant was 44 years old at the time of the trial.) These 
seizures did not, however. interfere with his employment 
until 1944 or 1945. when they began to increase in frequency 
and severity. Defendant received occasional treatment at the 
Kern General Hospital for severa] years ~hereafter. and. on 
the advice of its doctors. he quit working. His condition he-
came progressively worse until. in 1948. he was examined by 
Dr. Richard Loewenberg. Chief Visiting Psychiatrist at the 
Kern General Hospital. after having a particularly severe 
•. seizure. Dr. Loewenberg diagnosed him as an epileptic with 
. clouded state and equivalentsl and prescribed dilantin and 
phenobarbital. anticonvulsant medicines used to control 
epilepsy. Several days later defendant had another severe 
,;; 'The clouded state is an equivalent or substitute for the epileptic! con· 
YUlsion. Dr. Loewenberg, in his testimony at the trial, defined the 
clouded state as follows: "Clouded state means a narrowing in of the 
7 lltate of consciousness in which from a !uperficial observation of the 
V patient, he doesn't seem to have anything wrong with him at all. He 
, can move about. He might be able to talk. He can do all kinds of 
-; itemized actione. That means like winding a watch, taking a cigarette. 
, There are hundreds of minor movemente and motion! that everybody 
; does even without thinking about. But there are ·eertain lacke of in-
~ hibitions. They enn get extremely aggressive and violent. . .. A clouded 
; state can last from a v('ry short period ot time to many days, and once 
: in a while into weeks." It was also stated, by both doctors who took 
:.' part in the trial, thnt an epileptie would have no recollection of what 
~oeC!urred while hI' "'n~ in a ~lOlldcd stnte, that he would not be mentan, 
i~onaible for his actions durini that tim .. 
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seizure and was again taken to the Kern General Hospital 
and, on the recon:mendation of Dr. Loewenberg, he was ('om· 
mitted to Camarillo State Mental Hospital. There he was 
diagnosed as an epileptic with clouded state, convulsive seiz-
ures, and psychosis. He was later paroled from Camarillo 
to the care of his wife. The evidence indicates that on his 
return from that institution his condition was much better 
for se\'eral months, but the clouded state and seizures re-
turned, gradually increasing in frequency and severity until 
he was again committed to Camarillo. Between the years 
1948 and 1951, he was committed to Camarillo three different 
times. After each commitment, he was paroled to his wife, 
and he was still on parole at the time she was killed. During 
these years he remained in the care of Dr. Loewenberg and 
continued to take the medicines that he prescribed. After a 
little experimentation, the dosage was fixed at three-four 
capsules of dilantin (one and one-half grains each) and one 
phenobarbital tablet (one and one-half grains) per day. 
Clara Baker was killed at approximately 1 a. m., April 
21, 1951. During the day of April 20, 1951, defendant stllyed 
at home taking care of six or seven of his wife's sister's 
children, while she worked in the potato sheds. Defendant 
was alone with the children in the early afternoon, when he 
had a seizure and fell out the back door. As he regained 
consciousness, he found one of the little girls rubbing his 
face with a wet cloth. He went intQ the house and lay on 
the dh'an in the living room. The child put a cold wet cloth 
on his forehead, as she had seen defendant's wife do. Clara 
Baker returned home at 4 in the afternoon, accompanied by 
several women from the neighborhood, who left shortly tIl erc-
after. Defendant's children returned from school at 4 :30. 
HIS daughter, Merlene, noticed that her father looked sick. 
At defendant's request, his son Bob gave him some of his 
medicine. Bob made an error and gave defendant Clara's 
pills, and he took them by mistake. He also took his own 
pills, and there is evidence that he took an overdose of pills 
later in the evening. Defendant and his wife had planned to 
go to a show that night, but Clara told him that he ditln't 
look well and that they shouldn't go. At her suggestion lJe 
lay on the divan for awhile. Defendant rerr.ember~ nothi"g' 
after that until he "a"'akcned" in the Kern General ITospitnl 
three days later. Although dcfenllant had no recollection of 
it, it was established that about 6 p. m. he cnEed on lli<; 
brother Robert, who 1ived two bloc.:ks away, to borrow money 
) 
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for the show. Robert Baker testified that defendant was 
staggering when he was at his house and that, as defend-
ant was Leaving, he staggered Illto the door facing. He helped 
defendant out, and told him to go straight home. The evidence 
indicates that he did return home directly. and that he re-
mained there the rest of the evening. 
During the evening of April 20th defendant's children 
were listening to the radio. They testified that their parents 
were bickering over trivial matters, as they had often done 
in the past. Defendant was complaining because they had 
not gone to the show, and because he wanted the family car 
to make a trip to Arkansas. The testimony of the children 
, indicated that the quarrel was neither serious nor heated, 
but they also testified that at one point defendant threatened 
to kill Clara. There was further testimony that defendant 
had so threatened Clara several times in the past, and that 
the threats always occurred when defendant's seizures were 
) becoming so severe that Clara would suggest that he return 
h.' to Camarillo. Clara never seemed frightened by his threats 
i and often remarked, as she did on the night of April 20th, 
that he should "go ahead and get it over with." The chil-
dren went to bed and to sleep around 10 or 10 :30. At that 
time, Clara was lying on the divan in the living room because 
its hardness would relieve her backache, and defendant was 
sitting on a chair in the kitchen with his feet propped up 
on another chair. 
Sometime during the night, defendant's youngest child, 
L: Larry, was awakened by an unusual noise, "kind of like a r pig. " He went into the living room where he found defendant 
t· standing by the divan on which his mother was lying. She 
f did not move or speak, and the child saw blood running down 
her nose and onto the floor. Defendant told the boy to 
"get back to bed before I knock hell out of you." From 
his bed Larry could see into the kitchen, and almost imme-
diately he saw defendant go through the kitchen, in which 
a light was on, and out the back door. Defendant returned 
in half a minute, stayed in the kitchen for a short time, went 
out the back door again and did not return. . Larry testified 
that he did not have auything in his bands when he saw him 
in the living room or when be passed through the kitchen 
to go out the back door. After defendant left the house the 
second time, fJarry awakened his brother and sister. Merlene 
,approached the divan to speak to her mother and got blood 
~ ... 
:) 
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on the robe she was wearing. The children decided to go 
to an uncle's house a few houses away, but before they left 
Merlene notired that a small paring knife was missing from 
the kitchen. The children testified that as they left the house 
they found the front door locked from the inside by a wooden 
latch. On their way out Merlene, who was barefooted, stepped 
on a burning cigarette butt on the walk between their front 
porch and the street. None of the children recalled having 
heard their dog bark at any time that night. They went to 
their uncle's house, and the police were called. 
The police arrived at the Baker house at approximately 
1 :20 a. m., April 21, 1951. They found Clara Baker lying 
on the divan in the living room. The autopsy surgeon testi-
fied that death had been caused by two violent blows on 
the head. The wounds had bled profusely, and there was 
much blood over her face and body and on the floor under 
the couch. The right side of her skull, behind and below the 
ear and at the base, was extensively fractured. The nature 
of the wounds indicated that the blows were struck by a 
weapon "that had both something of an edge and some 
weight. " The autopsy surgeon thought that the weapon was 
probably an "ordinary hatchet" or an axe. 
Defendant was arrested at his brother Robert's house two 
blocks away. After he had left his owr ''"'~e the second. 
time. defendant had apparently proceeded, l., ,\'U an alley that 
ran alongside the house. then through a field to an irrigation 
canal into which he fell or jumped. He climbed out of the 
canal and went to his brother's house. Robert testified that 
defendant was wet from head to foot and was in "pretty bad 
shape" when he arrived. He helped him into the house and 
onto a sofa. Defendant told Robert. "We have to get over 
to the house." and Robert thought he also mumbled something 
about chasing someone. When the officers arrived a short 
time later, defendant was unable to stand by himself. In 
the police car. defendant told the officers that he did not kill 
his wife, that the killer was a "great big man about four 
feet tall." The police did not take defendant to jail. but 
took him to the Kern General Hospital. They did so, they 
said, because there appeared to be something wrong with him 
and because he was irrational and incoherent. 
The police searched the Baker house and the surrounding 
area. The canal was drained and the bottom raked for 
one-half block on either side of the point at which defendant 
went into it. The Bakers' outside toilet was moved and the 
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septic tank was pumped. The murder weapon was never 
found. The small paring knife that was missing from the 
Bakers' kitchen was found in the canal, but the prosecution 
admitted that it could not have been the murder weapon. 
Two of the officers followed defendant's tracks to the canal. 
They did so with the aid of one of defendant's shoes that 
had been taken from him at the time of his arrest. These 
two officers testified that defendant's tracks were the only 
fresh ones going down the alley and through the field, and 
that he appeared to be walking. On cross-examination, it 
was brought out that the alley was a hard-packed dirt path 
that was well-traveled, and that defendant's were not the 
only tracks in the field going toward the canal. One of the 
officers admitted that he could not say positively that de-
l fendant was not chasing someone down the alley, and the 
! other officer, although contending that there were no other t fresh tracks, admitted that he was .. mainly interested" in 
~ those of the defendant when he searched the alley. Plaster 
;. casts were not made of defendant's or any other tracks. 
t Defendant's clothes as well as a hatchet that was found in 
f' the Baker house were sent to the laboratory. There was 
testimony that the hatchet had no traces of blood, and that 
; it did not appear to have been washed. In the People's 
It closing argument, it was admitted that there were no blood t stains on defendant's clothing. No effort was made to clean 
defendant's fingernails to determine if he had had blood on 
his hands since they were last cleaned. No evidence was 
introduced of any fingerprints taken in the Baker house. 
'~ At 2 :35 on the afternoon of April 21st, Dr. Loewenberg 
, interviewed defendant at the Kern General, Hospital. He 
testified that defendant's tongue was coated, his left eyelid 
lWollen, and his speech "glossy" and incoherent. Defendant 
:,. told Dr. Loewenberg that he had taken too much medicine, 
, that he didn't remember what had happened, that he couldn't 
see, that he didn't know where his wife was, that she was 
~"'lying in the back bedroom and "[A] man with a black mask l came in, I don't know what he was.. Might be the guy who 
i stole the orange trees. I'm not gomg crazy. I took four 
~; capsules today. Bring Dr. Loewenberg here. He is the guy 
, who told me to take four capsules. • • • Where is my wife' 
: She should be up here by now. They can't keep me here. 
, I'm no criminal. I took too much of that medicine .••• I 
; want to know about my wife and kids. • . ." Dr. Loewen-
~~I testified that defendant was definitely in a clouded IItate 
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at the time of this interview, and that his incoherence was 
not caused by an overdose of medicine. After this interview 
the doctor advised the police that they could talk with de-
fendant that evening, but he warned that defendant was 
quite •• drowsy and dazed." 
A deputy sheriff and an investigator from the district 
attorney's office interviewed defendant that evening. The 
deputy sheriff, who testified about this interview, said that 
defendant didn't talk rationally, that he acted drunk, and 
appeared not to be well. He testified that defendant couldn't 
remember his age, but said that he could remember part of 
what had happened the preceding evening. Defendant said 
that he and Clara had been quarrelling, that each had taken 
a bath and Clara had lain on the divan in the living room 
while defendant went to bed in the back bedroom. He asked 
Clara to join him, but she refused. Defendant then went 
to sleep, and woke up hearing a noise in the living room. He 
got up to investigate, saw a man run out the front door, gave 
chase and wound up in the canal. After the interview, the 
deputy sheriff told defendant's parole officer from Camarillo 
that he was "personally satisfied that [defendant] was not 
mentally responsible at the time of the offense." The same 
officers also interviewed defendant on April 23d, after he 
had apparently regained consciousness. Defendant did not 
remember the previous interview. The deputy sheriff said 
that defendant still did not look well .. He told defendant 
that Clara was dead, and asked him if he had killed her. 
Defendant replied, "I might have, but if I did I don't re-
member it." He said that he was unable to remember any-
thing after 4 :30 on Friday afternoon (April 20th) when 
his son had given him some medicine and Clara had per-
suaded him to lie down for awhile. Dr. Loewenberg also 
saw defendant on April 23d. He testified·that defendant 
had torn his bed sheets into strips and tried to hide them. 
Although his speech was no longer glossy, he was unable to 
touch his finger to his nose in one motion. Defendant again 
complained about his eyes, saying that he had not been able 
to see for three weeks and that he had told his wife about it, 
but she had not believed him. 
During his stay in the Kern General Hospital, defendant 
was observed having several convulsive seizures and periods 
of unconsciousness. On May 29, 1951, the court appointed 
three doctors to examine defendant to determine his sanity. 
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clouded state, and that he was insane at the time of the offense 
and was then unable to determine the difference between 
right and wrong. All three recommended his commitment 
to a mental hospItal for the criminally insane. 
Considerable evidence was mtroduced of defendant's med-
ical history. This history showed that he has had epileptic 
seizures and periods of unconsciousness since he was 15 years 
of age. During the five-year period preceding his trial, he 
was conSIstently diagnosed by a number of doctors, psychia-
trists, and neurologists as an epileptic with clouded state and 
equivalents. Sometimes the word "psychosis" was added to 
the diagnosis. The doctors also agreed that a person with 
such a dlsease could be dangerous, but that he had probably 
been released from Camarillo because it was thought that, 
with regular dosages of anticonvulsant medicines, he would 
be. relatively harmless. The limitations of the hospital's facili-
ties and personnel were also a factor in this decision. Dr. 
Loewenberg, who had treated defendant more than any other 
doctor, said that in his opinion, on the basis of the defendant's 
history and his condition on the day following the crime, 
defendant was not mentally responsible at the time of Clara's 
death, that he was in a clouded state at that time. Defend-
ant's children testified that he frequently had "spells" and, 
although he appeared to them to be all right on the evening 
before Clara's death, the doctors testified that his seizures 
and clouded states could come on very quickly, in the space 
of a few minutes. The records of the Mendocino hospital 
showed that defendant was diagnosed there as an epileptic 
. with clouded state and equivalents. and with. psychosis. These 
. records also show that Dr. R. S. !Wod, superintendent of 
that institution, agreed with this diagnosis and thought that 
defendant was in a clouded state at the time of the offense. 
In his testimony at the trial, however, Dr. Rood said that 
he doubted whether that diagnosis was correct. His doubts 
arose, he said, because neither the records of Mendocino nor 
those of Camarillo disclosed that defendant had been observed 
in an epileptic seizure. He testified, however, that there were 
80 many inmates in the yards of these institutions and so few 
attendants that seizures could easily go unnoticed. Defendant 
testified that he could remember having several seizures in 
each institution. In addition, the records of the Kern General 
Hospital contain several entries showing that nurses and doc-
tors had observed defendant in a seizure, and Dr. Loewenberg 
r, 
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had seen him in a clouded state on at least one oce;lSion. 
Furthermore, as the defense pointed out, all during defend- , 
ant's stay at both Camarillo and Mendocino he was given 
regular medication designed to reduce or prevent convulsive 
seizures. Dr. Rood also intimated that he thought defendant 
might not be an epileptic at all, but might have a heart disease 
known as paroxysmic tachycardia, or hysterical seizures, or 
he might be malingering. On cross-examination he admitted, 
however, that it was unlikely that a person with defendant's 
I.Q. could successfully malinger undiscovered for so long a 
period of time, and that it was unlikely that the 20 or more 
doctors who had diagnosed him were wrong. It should also 
be noted that Dr. Rood was not associated with the Mendocino 
hospital and did not see defendant until January, 1953, less 
than three months before defendant was returned to Kern 
County to stand trial. So far as the record shows, Dr. Rood's 
connection with defendant after January, 1953, was limitcc1 
to participation in one staff conference in February anLl 
another in March, 1953. 
There was also considerable evidence about the nature of 
the drugs defendant took by prescription. The experts were 
agreed that both dilantin and phenobarbital were hypnotic 
drugs and, if taken in overdose, could be dangerous since 
they would remove the inhibitions of the person taking them. 
There was testimony that these drngs had an intoxicating 
effect similar to that of alcohol, and that defendant oft('n 
acted drunk after taking his pills. There was also testimony 
that an overdose of these drugs could accelerate or aggravate 
the clouded state condition of an epileptic because persons 
in a clouded state lack normal inhibitions and sometimes 
become extremely aggressive and violent. 
Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to 
sustain his conviction of first degree murder, that it was 
not shown that he committed the crime, and that, even if it 
could be inferred that he did, it was not shown that the murder 
was deliberate and premeditated. 
Defendant points out that no blood was found on his person 
or on his clothes, that the murder weapon was never found, 
although an extensive search was conducted, and that the 
presence of the kitchen knife in the canal and the qualified 
character of the police officer's testimony a bout the tracks 
in the alley and the field, all tend to corroborate his state-
ment that he chased an intruder and fell into the canal. 
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[1] Although the evidence is weak and there are many 
unexplained and apparently uninyestigated items of evidence 
pointing away from defendant's guilt, the record supports 
the conclusion that defendant did in fact strike the fatal 
blows. It is undisputed that he was in the house at the 
time of his wife's death and that his statements as well as 
his son's placed him in the front room with his wife shortly 
after the blows were struck. Except for defendant's state-
ments, made at a time when the defense claims he was in a 
clouded state, there is no evidence that anyone else except 
the children "as in or about the Baker house at the time of 
the offense. Shortly after the crime, defendant told police 
i~.·.~"':""'" officers that he had chased an intruder out the front door. The children testified that the front door was locked from " the inside. They also testified that they did not hear their 
dog barking at any time during the night. In support of 
k his contention that it was not proved that he did strike the 
~ r. blows, defendant points to Merlene's testimony about stepping 
U on a lighted cigarette in the path leading from their front 
r porch to the street. Defendant testified that he had run out 
of cigarettes in the afternoon and had not smoked that 
evening. One of the children testified, however. that de-
, fendant was sitting by the kitchen stove smoking sometime 
( after dinner. The jury could reasonably have concluded that 
~: defendant ran aronnd the house and intentionally or acci-
", dentally dropped the cigarette when he ran out the first 
time after his son Larry was awakened. [2] It was for the 
jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine 
, the inferences to be drawn therefrom. (People v. Daugherty, 
. 40 Ca1.2d 876. 884-885 [256 P.2d 911] ; People v. Green, 
,13 Ca1.2d 37, 42 [87 P.2d 821] ; People v. Perkins, 8 Ca1.2d 
t.· .. 502, 510 [66 P.2d 631] ; People v. Watts, 198 Cal. 776, 789 
! [247 P. 884]; People v. Tom Woo, 181 Cal. 315, 326 [184 
t P. 389].) 
r " [3] Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient 
r to support the verdict that he was sane at the time the offense r was alleged to have been committed. The positive evidence 
i was overwhelming that defendant was not sane, but the 
~. People contend that the "personal appearance, mannerisms 
~. and actions of the defendant before the jurors during the 
~, trial. and the character of his testimony and manner of giving 
kit, were matters properly considered by" the jury (People 
~:' .. ''Y~ Chamberlain, 7 Cal.2d 257. 230-261 [60 P.2d 299]) and >"ere sufficient to support the verdict of, sanity. This conteD-
:r, 
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tion cannot be sustained. Defendant was not brought to trial 
for more than two years after the- death of his wife. During 
that period he was confined in a mental hospital and was not 
brought to trial until the superintendent of the mental hos-
pital certified that he had recovered his sanity so as to be 
able to assist counsel in the conduct of his trial. There was 
no showing whatever that defendant's mental condition was 
the same at the time of his trial as it was immediately after 
the death of his wife. Under these circumstances the jury 
could not reasonably infer from defendant's conduct at the 
trial that he was sane at the time of the offense. 
The People also rely on the rebuttable presumption of 
sanity. [4] On the trial of the issue raised by the plea of 
not guilty by reason of insanity. there is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that defendant was sane at the time the crime 
was committed (People v. Myers, 20 Cal. 518; People v. Loper, 
159 Cal. 6, 11 [112 P. 720, Ann. Cas. 1912B 1193] ; People v. 
Williams, 184 Cal. 590,593 [194 P. 1019] ; People v. Hickman, 
204 Cal. 470, 477 [268 P. 909, 270 P. 1117] ; People v. Leong 
Fook, 206 Cal. 64. 67, 70 [273 P. 779] ; People v. Chamber-
lain, 7 Cal.2d 257, 260 [60 P.2d 2991) and defendant has 
the burden of proving his insanity by a preponderance of 
the evidence (People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 901 [256 
P.2d 911). [5] Proof that defendant was amicted with 
a permanent insanity, as distinguished from a temporary or 
transient insanity, prior to the commission of the crime 
charged will, however, dispel the presumption of sanity and 
raise a presumption that his insanity continued to exist until 
the time of the commission of the crime. (People v. Farrell, 
31 CaL 576, 581; People v. Francis, 38 Cal. 183, 188-191; 
People v. Lane, 101 Cal. 513, 518-519 [36 P. 16) ; People v. 
Schmitt, 106 Cal. 48, 53 [39 P. 204] ; People·v. Findley, 132 
Cal. 301, 307 [64 P. 472]; People v. Keyes, 178 Cal. 794, 
800-801 [175 P. 6) ; State of Oregon v. Garver, 190 Ore. 291, 
299-309 [225 P.2d 771J and authorities cited; see 8 Cal.Jur., 
§ 143; 27 A.L.R.2d 121; 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 
§ 212 [11th ed., 1935].} [6] In the present case, there was 
ample evidence to establish defcndant's insanity prior to the 
killing of his wife. He had repeatedly been diagnosed as 
an epileptic with clouded state and psychosis; he had been 
adjudicated an insane person and thrice committed to the 
Camarillo State Mental Hospital, and he was on parole from 
that hospital at the time of the crime. He was similarly 
adju~ed insane shortly after the crime was committed. 
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Although we cannot say as a matter of law that the evidence 
di~charged defendant's burden of proving that he was insane 
at the time of the offense, the jury should have been instructed 
that proof of a permanent insanity prior to the commission 
of the crime raised a presumption that such insanity con-
tinued to exist until the time of the offense. 
[7] Defendant also contends that the joint trial of his 
pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity so 
t confused the issues that defendant's right to a fair and im-
ft",::" partial trial was prejudiced. Defendant's counsel, however, stipulated that the two pleas could be tried together. Although 
~'. defendant cannot complain of the joinder as such (see People 
v. Hazelwood, 24 Cal.App.2d 690, 692 [76 P.2d 151] ; People v. 
Pettinger, 94 Cal.App. 297, 300-301 [271 P. 132]; see also 
People v. Dessaner, 38 Cal.2d 547, 554 [241 P.2d 238]), he 
did not by his stipulation waive any errors that might have 
,- been committed, as a result of the joinder, by the court in 
instructing the jury. 
The court instructed the jury in part as follows: "A pre-
sumption is a deduction which the law expressly directs to 
be made from particular facts. Unless declared by law to be 
conclusive. it may be controverted by other evidence ..•. 
"Upon the trial of the issue raised by the plea of not guilty, 
the defendant is conclusively presumed to have been sane at 
the time the offense is alleged to have been committed .... 
"A person must be presumed to intend to do that which 
he voluntarily and wilfully does in fact do, and must also 
be presumed to intend the natural, probable and usual conse-
;: quences of his own acts. Tberefore when one person assails 
another voluntarily with a dangerous weapon likely to kill, 
and which does in fact destroy the life of the person assailed, 
" the presumption is that such assailant intended death or 
. other great bodily harm. 
"Any such presumption as I have mentioned, however, 
~',',. may be overcome by contrary evidence; and any such evi-
~ denee is sufficient to overcome it which creates in the minds 
t: of the jurors a reasonable doubt that the defendant's intent 
~. was as so presumed. In the absence of evidence to the con-
[ trary. the presnmfltion mnst prevail. 
1:, "There has been testimony concerning the mental state 
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of the defendant at the time of the offense charged against 
him in the information, and you will be instructed as to the 
law concerning the test of insanity as a defense to a criminal 
charge. Before you determine whether or not the defendant 
was legally sane or insane at the time of the offense alleged 
against him in the information, however, it will be necessary 
that you first determine his guilt or innocence. 
"In determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant, 
you are to be governed by the conclusive presumption that 
the defendant was sane at the time the offense was alleged 
to have been committed. A conclusive presumption, as a 
matter of law, is not rebuttable. Therefore the conclusive 
presumption that the defendant was sane and of sound mind 
at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the 
information is not rebuttable, and if yo:!! are convinced from 
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
did unlawfully kill his wife, •.. then you must find the 
defendant guilty, even though you, as jurors, may have some 
doubt as to the present soundness of mind of the defendant, 
or some doubt of the soundness of mind of the defendant at 
the time of the commission of the crime, as charged in the 
information. This means that he is presumed to have the 
legal capacity to commit the act so far as sanity is concerned 
but it does not preclude you from finding that the mental 
state of the defendant was such that he did not have the 
intent necessary to constitute the crime. 
"The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to the 
crime charged in the information and has also entered a plea 
of not guilty by reason of insanity, thereby alleging that 
he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense 
charged in the information. After the issue raised by the 
plea of not guilty is determined it will be necessary for you 
to determine the issue raised by the plea of not guilty by 
reason of insanity if you should find defendant guilty of 
the crime charged in the information, because the law does 
not hold a person criminally accountable for his conduct if 
at the time thereof he was insane. 
"The sole issue for you to determine in regard to the 
insanity plea is whether or not the defendant was sane or 
insane at the time of the commission of said otfense. You 
must determine the condition of his mind at the precise time 
of the criminal conduct if he is found guilty of such crime . • • 
. . ... 
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"The law presumes that the defendant was sane. That 
presumption may be rebutted but is controlling until over-
come by a preponderance of the evidence as, when weighed 
with that opposed to it, has more convincing force, and from 
which it results that the greater probability of truth lies 
therein. . .. .. 
"You are reminded, however, that a person might be l<.'gally 
sane, as we define the term in dealing with the question of 
criminal responsibility, and yet be in an abnormal mental 
, or nervous condition; and because of such condition he might 
be less likely or unable to have or to hold a specific intent 
or a certain state of mind, which is an essential ingredient 
, of a certain crime. We have received evidence bearing on 
.! the mental and nervous condition of the defendant at the 
, 'time of the alleged commission of the crime charged. Such 
evidence may be considered by you in determining whether 
;. or not the defendant did any overt act, charged against him, 
,', and, if so, whether or not, at that time, there existed in him 
,~ the specific mental factor which, as you have been instructed, 
,tmust accompany that act to constitute a certain crime or 
:, degree of crime." 
, [8] These instructions are confused, contradictory. and 
ambiguous. They did not inform the jury in clear and un-
'; mistakable terms of the principles that must guide their 
: deliberations; in particular, they did not inform the jury 
',what part of the evidence bearing on defendant's mental 
. condition was applicable to the several issues submitted to 
~them. The jury was first instructed that only conclusive 
)resumptions are not rebuttable. It was then declared that 
: on the issue raised by the plea of not guilty, defendant is 
,:, eonclusively presumed to have been sane at the time the 
"offense was committed. Next, several presumptions are men-
'tioned relating to the general proposition that all persons 
;'are presumed to intend the usual and probable consequences 
:'of their acts. The court then stated. "Any such presumption 
, 18 I have mentioned, however, may be overcome by contrary 
>,evidence .•. " (Italics added.) The court had just men-
,~tioned the conclusive presumption of sanity; and the quoted 
'.:statement is in direct contradiction to the earlier statement 
';.that conclusive presumptions are not rebuttable. The re-
': ..w.nder of the statement just quoted-CO any [contrary) evi-
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been mentioned,] which creates in the minds of the jurors a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant's intent was as so pre-
sumed "-may indicate that the court meant only that the 
presumptions that men intend the usual and probable conse-
quences of their acts could be overcome by contrary evidence. 
The statement is susceptible of this construction, but the 
apparent contradiction involved must be weighed with the 
other elements of confusion and ambiguity that are discussed 
below. 
Immediately after the instructions just discussed, the 
jury was again instructed that on the issues raised by the plea 
of not guilty, defendant is conclusively presumed" sane and 
of sound mind at the time of the commission of the crime 
charged. . . . [I] f you are cominced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant did unlawfully kill his wife, . . . 
then you must find the defendant guilty, even though you, 
as jurors, may have some doubt as to the present soundness 
of mind of the defendant, or some doubt of the soundness of 
mind of the defendant at the time of the commission of the 
crime, as charged in the information. This means that he 
is presumed to have had the capacity to commit the act so 
far as sanity is concerned but it does not preclude you from 
finding that the mental state of the defendant was such that 
he did not have the intent necessary to constitute the crime." 
(Italics added.) By the use of the word "intent" in the last 
phrase and in other instructions. it is clear that the court 
meant the intent involved in the elements of malice afore-
thought, premeditation. and deliberation. It is also clear 
from the context that the court used the phrase "sound mind" 
as the equivalent of legal sanity. for it was said that on the 
trial of the issue of not guilty a person is conclusively pre-
sumed to be of "sound mind." [9] "Sound mind" and 
"legal sanity" are not synonymous. Indeed, in the instructions 
explaining legal sanity to the jury in this case the phrase 
"sound mind" was not used. As has been long estab-
lished, a person is legally sane if he knows the nature and 
quality of his acts, and their wrongfulness. if any. (People 
v. Kimball, 5 C~I.2d 608, 610 [55 P.2d 483] ; People v. Keaton, 
211 Cal. 722, 724 [296 P. 609].) "Soundness" of mind is 
defined as "free from flaw. defect or decay, perfect of the 
kind; undamaged or unimpaired; healthy, not diseased or 
injured, robust-said of body or mind." (Webster's New 
Internat. Diet., p. 2403.) [10] The distinction that these defini-
tions draw between soundness of mind and legal IIBDiV iI 
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impliedly recognized in section 26 of the Penal Code, which 
provides that lunatics, idiots, and insane persons are not 
capable of committing crimes. It is expressly provided in 
section 21 of the Penal Code that idiots and lunatics are 
not of sound mind; yet, if soundness of mind and legal sanity 
are synonymous, the express provisions of secti.on 26 exempt-
ing idiots and lunatics from criminal responsibility would be 
superfluous because they would necessarily be included within 
the provision exempting the insane. 
[11]' The prejudicial nature of the instruction appears 
most clearly in the difficulties that it creates for the jury in 
the application of the rule stated in People v. Wells, 33 Ca1.2d 
330, 346-358 [202 P.2d 53], that evidence of a mental in-
fumity, not amounting to legal insanity, is admissible and 
should be considered by the jury on the questions of pre-
meditation and deliberation. If the defendant has a "sound 
mind," that is, "a healthy and robust mind, neither diseased 
nor injured," it necessarily follows that he would not have 
a mental infirmity making him incapable of premeditating 
or deliberating. If an idi.ot or a lunatic were charged with 
f a crime, an instruction that he was conclusively presumed 
~. to be of "sound mind" would create an obvious conflict with 
his statutory defense. [12] Although moronity and the mental 
~. condition caused by epileptic seizures, unless they amount to i unconsciousness, are not included within the exempting provi-
sions of section 26 of the Penal Code, nevertheless these con-I" ditions may indicate some lack of a "healthy and robust .• '.... mind" and do have bearing on the question of the capacity 
to premeditate and deliberate. [13] In the present case, evi-
dence introduced by the People as well as by defendant shows 
that defendant is a moron and has been, for many years, sub-
ject to epileptic attacks affecting his mental faculties in vary-
ing degrees and for varying lengths of time. At the trial. de-
fendant testified that he did not remember anything that 
happened the night his wife was killed. One of his defenses 
was that if he killed his wife, which he did not remember 
doing, he did it while under the influence of an epileptic 
attack. Defendant claims that this condition amounted to 
legal insanity or, alternatively, that it nep'atived any elcment 
of premeditation or deliberation. The only evidence pointing 
to premeditation and deliberation is the testimony of the 
Baker children that defendant threatened his wife earlier in 
the evening. There was also testimony that defendant had 
threatened hia wife '. life several times during a three- or 
) 
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four-year period preceding the offense. But each of the sev-
eral persons who testified about such threats qualified their 
testimony by saying that the threats were made just before 
defendant had an epileptic seizure or when defendant's epi-
leptic condition had become so aggravated that his return 
to the Camarillo hospital was imminent. There is no evidence 
that during the intervals when defendant was free from the 
clouding effects of his disease, he had any animosity toward 
his wife or that he had ever harmed her. Further, the evi-
dence is uncontradicted that defendant, when not suffering 
an attack of epilepsy, had a friendly, sunny, and harmless 
disposition, and there is no evidence that the Baker family 
life was anything but harmonious during the intervals de-
fendant was free from the effects of his disease. In addition, 
there is the fact that when the Baker children went to bed 
on the night of the crime, the Baker household was peaceful. 
Clara was resting on the divan in the living room, and 
defendant was sitting propped up on two chairs in the 
kitchen. Their bickering about attending a show and about 
defendant's proposed trip to Arkansas had stopped. 
Defendant's conduct after the killing also points away 
from premeditation. He did not attempt as did the de-
fendant in People v. Eggers, 30 Ca1.2d 676 [185 P.2d 1], 
to hide the body or to mutilate it to prevent identification. 
Defendant claimed that he chased an intruder down the 
alley, and there is evidence of hallucinations in his medical 
history. Furthermore, defendant did not attempt to hide 
himself. Instead, he went almost immediately to his brother's 
house, where his only intelligible words were, "We have got 
to get over to the house." His brother, as well as the police 
officers who arrested him, testified that defendant was irra-
tional and incoherent at this time. The police officers took 
him to the hospital rather than to jail. D~. Loewenberg, 
who visited defendant at the hospital some 13 hours after 
the crime. testified that defendant was then in a clouded 
state, and that, in his opinion, he was in a clouded state at 
the time of the killing. It was thus a very close question 
of fact whether or not the People had proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the killing was "willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated." It was, therefore, vital that the jury 
be properly instructed in clear and unambiguous terms. It 
was error for the court to instruct the jury that on the trial 
of the issue of not guilty, defendant was conclusively pre-
sumed to be of "sound mind." The effect of such an instruc-
) 
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tion was to tell the jury that it could not consider defendant's 
moronity and the effect on his mental faculties of many years' 
suffering from epilepsy in determining his defense based on 
lack of capacity to premeditate and deliberate. 
[14] Furthermore, this instruction creates an irreconcil-
able conflict with the subsequent instruction that the jury 
could consider defendant's mental state in determining 
whether he had the "intent" necessary to constitute malice 
aforethought, premeditation, or deliberation. The instruction 
also creates an irreconcilable conflict with the last paragraph 
of the court's instruction on defendant's plea of not guilty 
· by reason of insanity. After the jury was instructed 
.. on . the issues raised by this plea, that defendant has the 
· burden of proving his insanity by a preponderance of the 
: evidence (People v. Daugherty, 40 Ca1.2d 876, 901 [256 P.2d 
~91l]), and that there is a rebuttable presumption that de-
· fendant was legally sane at the time of the commission of 
~: the offense (People v. Ohamberlain, 7 Ca1.2d 257, 260 [GO 
.P.2d 299]), the jury was then "reminded, however, that a 
.• person might be legally sane . • • and yet be in an abnormal 
:: mental or nervous condition; and because of such condition 
might be less likely or unable to have or to hold a specific 
; intent or a certain state of mind, which is an essential ingre-
; dient of a certain crime. • • • [Evidence 1rearing on defend-
. ant's mental or nervous condition] may be considered by 
. you in determining whether or not the defendant did any 
overt act charged against him and, if so, whether or not. at 
~that time, there existed in him the specific mental factor which, 
18 you have been instructed must accompany that act to 
,'eonstitute a certain crime or degree of crime." There is thus 
.:_ "irreconcilable conflict in the instructions, arid we are not 
\.t h"berty to speculate as to which of them the jury followed. 
t[Citations.]" (People v. Deloney, 41 Ca1.2d 832, 829 [264 
·:P.2d 532].) 
~:;, [15] Defendant also complains of another instruction re-
lAting to the issue of premeditation and deliberation. lIe 
'aontends that the trial court erred in failing correctly to 
;'instruct the jury on the effect of his intoxication on the 
·:,question of the intent with which he committed the acts 
ebarged. The jury was given an instruction2 bascd on the 
~~ 
~~'.' ·"Our law provides that 'no act committed by a person while in a 
te of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having 
in such a condition.' This rule applies to intoxication from any 
wlum voluntariq produced bl the perSOJl later char,ed with the 
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first sentence of section 22 of the Penal Code: "No act com-
mitted by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication 
is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condi-
tion." Defendant contends the court erred in not givin~ an 
instructionS based on the second sentence of section 22: "But 
whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose. 
motive, or intent is a necessary element to constitute any 
particular species or degree of crime. the jury must take into 
consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at 
the time. in determining the purpose. motive. or intent with 
which he committed the act." This sentence has been inter-
preted to include intoxication by drugs as well as by intoxi-
cating liquors. (People v. Sameniego, 118 Cal.App. 165, 173 
[4 P.2d 809. 5 P.2d 653] : People v. 'Lim Dum Dong, 26 Cal. 
App.2d 135, 140 [78 P.2d 1026].) In Peopl.e v. Coyne, 92 
Cal.App.2d 413 [206 P.2d 1099], the trial court had instructed '-
the jury in the language of the first sentence of section 22 
only. In reversing the judgment of conviction of first degree 
murder, the District Court of Appeal said: '" [I]n deter-
mining whether or not the killing was so willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated as to constitute murder in the first degree, 
it is proper for the jury to consider how much his mental 
condition at the time was affected by intoxication, and. there 
being an express statutory declaration upon the subject of 
intoxication, a defendant in a murder case is entitled to have 
an instruction embracing such statutory declaration given 
crime; and it means that such intoxieation. it shown by the evidence 
to have existed in the defendant when he allegedly committed the crime 
charged, is not of itself a defense in this ease. It may throw light on 
the occurrence and aid you in determining what took place, but when a 
person in a atate of intoxication. voluntarily produced by himself, com· 
mits a crime auch al that charged against the defendant in this case. 
the law does not permit him to use his own vice as a ahelter against the 
normal. legal consequences of his conduct." (CALJIC No. 78·.!..) 
·Such as CALJIC No. 78·B, "However. when the existence of any 
particular motive, purpose or intent is a neeessary element to constitute 
a particular kind or degree ot crime. the jury. in determining whether 
or not such motive. purpose or intent existed in the mind ot the accusrd. 
must tnke into consideration the evidence oft'ered to prove that the 
accused was intoxicated at the time wben the crime allegedly was ~om· 
mitted. 
"Thus in the crime of murder in the first degree, it is a necessary 
element ot the crime that the killing be willful, deliberate and pre-
meditated. This tact requires an inquiry into the Btate ot mind under 
which the defendant committed the act charged. if he did commit it. 
In pursuing that inquiry, it is proper to consider whether he was iDe 
toxicated at the time of the alleged offense. The weight to be give. 
the evidence on that question nnd thl' significanee to attach to it in re~ 
tiGa *- aB UIe other evidence are exelusiveq within 70ur pro"riMeo" 
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by the court to the jury where there is evidence which makes 
it applicable; and, for the refusal of the court to give the 
instruction under discussion the judgment must be reversed 
and 8 new trial ordered.' ... The fact that an instruction 
on intoxication (though inadequate) was given, indicates that 
the trial judge had satisfied himself that the evidence was . . . 
sufficient to put the question • within the province of the jury.' 
His judgment on this question would seem to settle all doubts 
on the matter. . . . The failure to give the instruction in 
the language of section 22 was unquestionably prejudicial 
error." (92 Cal.App.2d at 416-417, quoting People v. Hill, 
123 Cal. 47. 52 [55 P. 692] : see also People v. Vincent, 95 
Cal. 425, 428 [30 P. 581] ; People v. Griggs, 17 Cal.2d 621, 625 
[110 P.2d 1031] ; People v. Blake, 65 Cal. 275,278 [4 P. 1]; 
People v. Sanchez, 35 Ca1.2d 522. 527-529 [219 P.2d 9].) 
In this case there was ample evidence of intoxication in the 
record to raise a question of fact for the jury. There was 
-evidence that defendant had voluntarily taken an overdose 
'of both dilantin and phenobarbital on the night of the killing. 
Both of these drugs were described as hypnotics. as having 
the effect of removing the inhibitions of the person taking 
them, and as having an intoxicating effect similar to that of 
Alcohol. There was testimony that when defendant had taken 
dosages of these drugs he acted groggy, like a "drinking 
man." 
ij The factual issue was thus raised. and the court's failure 
" instruct the jury that it could consider defendant's intoxi-
Jation by drugs in determining whether or not defendant 
~mmitted the offense with premeditation and deliberation Wa! 
Jighly prejudicial. Indeed, the prejudicial effect of the 
r&ilure to instruct was enhanced by the inadequate instruction 
E' ven-that defendant's acts were no less criminal by reason the fact that he was intoxicated at the time he committed 
"em. The giving of such an instruction without adding that 
.. efendant" ;ntoxi,.t;on ,ould. however. be .ons;dered ;n 
~etermining the degree of the offense committed. had the 
~e effect as if the jury were told that defendant's drugged 
.,ndition could not influence their decision on any issue sub-
o 'tted to them. Defendant's defense on the theory of intoxi. 
,0 tion-the difference between first and second degree murder 
,,'W88 thus completely negatived by the instructions of the 
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overcome by other instructions given by the court. The first 
of these4 was a part of the instructions on insanity, which 
informed the jury that even if they found defendant snne 
such a finding would not preclude them from finding that hi~ 
mental or nervous condition was such that he was incapable 
of deliberation or premeditation. This instruction did not 
inform the jury of the weight to be given to defendant's 
intoxication. Instead, it was responsive to defendant's de-
fense that he was incapable of premeditation because of his 
moronity, his psychological disorders, and the mental deterio_ 
ration caused by his epilepsy. The defense based on intoxi-
cation raised an entirely separate issue and should have been 
covered by a separate instruction. (Of. People v. Sanchez, 
35 Ca1.2d 522, 528 [219 P.2d 9].) The other two in-
structions, which the People claim overcome the error in 
failing to instruct on intoxication, informed the jury that 
there is a rebuttable presumption of consciousness, II that an 
act committed by a person in a state o~ unconsciousness is 
not a crime, and that the "involuntary intoxication produced 
by drugs or spiritous liquors" is an example of the uncon-
sciousness that negates criminal responsibility.s (Italics 
"'You are reminded, however, that a person might be legally eline, 
u we define that term in dealing with the question of criminal respon~i­
bility, and yet be in an abnormal mental or nervous condition; and 
because of such condition he might be less likely or unable to have or to 
hold a specific intent or a certain state of mind, which is an essenthl 
ingredient of a certain crime. We have received evidence bearing on 
the mental and nervous condition of the defendant at the time of the 
alleged commission of the crime charged. - Such evidence may be con-
sidered by you in determining whether or not defendant did any o'l'"crt 
act charged against him and. if so, whether or not, at that time, there 
existed in him the specific mental factor which, as you have been in-
structed, must accompany that act to constitute a certain crime or degree 
of crime." 
"'When the evidence shows that a defendant acted as if he was con-
seious, the law presumes that he then was conscious. This presumption 
is disputable, but is controlling on the question of consciousness until 
overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. ; .• The rule of law jn.t 
announced does not change, or make an exception to, the law whirh 
places upon the people the burden of proving defendant's guilt beyon,1 
a reasonable doubt." This instruction was specifically disapproycd 1'1 
this court in People v. Hardy, 33 Ca1.2d 52, 63-64 [198 P.2d 86.:>1. In 
the present case, however, the instruction was requested by defcntbnt 
and the error was therefore. invited • 
• , 'When a person commits an act without being conscious thereof, he 
docs not thereby commit a crime even though such an act would constitute 
a crime if committed by a person when conscious. 
"The condition of unconsciousness to which this instnlCtion refrrs 
is by law distinguished and clarified from insanity, which is also in 
issue here, but is to be decided by you separately. 
"The etate of unconsciousness to which I refer in this present instruo-
) 
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added.} [17] Unconsciousness is a complete, not a partial, 
defense to a criminal charge (Pen. Code, § 26, subd. 5), and, 
although voluntary intoxication may at times amount to un-
consciousness, yet it can only have the effect of negating 
specific intent, the applicable code section being section 22 
and not 26, subdivision 5. (People v. Anderson, 87 Cal.App.2d 
857,860-861 [197 P.2d 839] ; People v. Sameniego, supra, 118 
Cal.App. 165, 173.) [18] In this case there was ample evidence 
of voluntary intoxication, and there was also evidence that 
defendant was unconscious at the time of the offense because 
he was in the "clouded state" of an epileptic attack. The 
evidence of unconsciousness being present, the instruction 
based on Penal Code, section 26, subdivision 5, was properly 
given, for defendant's complete defense based on unconscious-
ness was entirely separate from his partial defense based on 
. intoxication_ 
[19] It is contended, however, that defendant was not .v ..... "~.ily intoxicated "because he took his pills and capsules 
ward off an attack of epilepsy, and because he took hill 
's pills by mistake," and that, therefore, his defense 
adequately covered by the instruction on the effect of 
This contention cannot be sustained. There 
evidence of the nature of his wife's pills and thus 
from which the jury could infer that those pills had 
an intoxicated or unconscious condition. The fact 
defendant took his own pills, which are conceded to have 
intoxicating effect, to ward off an attack of epilepsy may 
may not mean that defendant was involuntarily rather 
voluntarily intoxicated. It is conceded that defendant 
the pills knowingly, but whether or not the imminent 
.~lnlDr()ach of an epileptic attack was sufficient to render his 
a'fu'-'-", compulsive and thus involuntary was a question for 
jury. Moreover, the fact that the court did give an 
instruction on voluntary intoxication was enough 
a doubt in the minds of the jurors. Although we 
t hesitate before holding that the absence of any instruc-
voluntary intoxication in a situation such as that 
.1prE~e]lted in this case is prejudicial error, when a partial 
is a condition experienced by a person normally sane, wherein there 
no functioning of the conscious mind •.. I shall cite a few examples 
this type of unconsciousn~ss to whieh this instruction refers: 8omnam· 
_ .• ; the delirium eaused by fever, involuntary intoxication 
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instruction has been given we cannot but hold that the failure 
to give complete instructions was prejudicial error. The facts 
and the partial instruction given might well lead the jury to 
believe that defendant's intoxication was not involuntary, but 
the effect of the instructions given was that the jury could 
consider defendant's intoxication only if they found that it 
was caused involuntarily and, further, found that it produced 
unconsciousness. If the jury found that defendant was vol-
untarily intoxicated, the instructions told them to disregard 
that condition in arriving at their verdict. That such instruc-
tions were in error is beyond question, and that they were 
highly prejudicial cannot be doubted. 
It is finally contended that the trial court had no duty, 
on its own motion, to give an instruction based on the second 
sentence of section 22 of the Penal Code. Defendant admits 
that he did not request such an instruction, but argues that 
the trial court was obligated correctly to instruct the jury 
on all the factual issues raised by the evidence presented. 
[20] As has been repeatedly held. .. It is incumbent upon 
a court in a criminal case to instruct the jury of its own 
motion, charging them fully and fairly upon the law relating 
to the facts of the case. [Citations., The court is not re-
lieved of the duty to give instructions whose necessity is 
'developed through the evidence introduced at the trial.' 
[Citation.] An instruction is necessary if it is vital to a 
proper consideration of the evidence by the jury. [Citations.] 
. • . The circumstances of the case determine whether the 
failure to instruct the jury constitutes prejudicial error." 
(People v. Putnam, 20 Ca1.2d 885. 890, 892 [129 P.2d 367]; 
see, also, People v. Warren. 16 Ca1.2d 103, 117 [104 P.2d 
1024] ; People v. HoZt, 25 Ca1.2d 59. 64 [153 P.2d 21] ; People 
v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 164. 176 f163 P.2d 8].) A proper 
consideration of the isaues developed through the presentation 
of the evidence at the trial of this case required that the jury 
be instructed on the possible effect of voluntary intoxication 
on the state of mind with which defendant did the acts 
charged. (People v. Sanchez. 35 Ca1.2d 522. 527-529 [219 
P.2d 9].) Moreover, this is not a case where there was a 
complete failure to instruct, but a case where partial instruc-
tions were given and, as given, were erroneous. The instruc-
tions given directed the jury's attention away from the vital 
issue raised by defendant's contention that he was not volun-
tarily intoxicated. Their verdict was. therefore, "uninstructed 
as to the law reIatiDe to the facts of [the] ease [and] eanBOt 
) 
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be sustained merely because proper instructions ,,"ere not 
·:requested." (People v. Bender, supra, 27 Ca1.2<l 164, 176.) 
; [21] Since the facts revealed by the evidence, entirely 
circumstantial in nature, show the case to be a very close one 
_ on the questions of guilt, sanity, and premeditation, we must 
; conclude that the numerous errors reviewed herein suhstan-
; tially and prejudicially aft'ected the rights of defendant. 
"'. Accordingly, a reversal is necessary to prevent a miscarriage 
. of justice. 
; _ The judgment and the order denying defendant's motion 
~. for a new trial are reversed. 
,<' Gibson, C. J., Carter, .J., and Schauer J., concurred. 
J 
}:':' Spence, J., concurred in the judgment. 
' .. "-
